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ABSTRACT
Objective: The US Public Health Service Panel on Cost-
Effectiveness has recommended the use of quality-
adjusted life-years (QALYs) as the best way to estimate
outcomes in a cost-effectiveness analysis. We evaluate the
importance of this recommendation by assessing whether
adjusting for health-related quality of life affects the ulti-
mate resource allocation decision implied by the cost-
effectiveness ratio for interventions aimed at cancer
prevention and control.
Methods: We identiﬁed 110 interventions in 39 arti-
cles for which both cost/life-year and cost/QALY
were reported. Interventions were forms of preven-
tion, early detection, or treatment of cancer. We cal-
culated a Spearman correlation to assess the ordinal
relationship between cost/life-year and cost/QALY. In
addition, we employed various decision thresholds to
assess whether the use of cost/life-year would yield
different resource allocation decisions than the use
of cost/QALY.
Results: The correlation between cost/life-year and cost/
QALY is 0.96 (P < .0001). Assuming a $50,000 decision
threshold, adjustment for quality of life would affect the
implied choice in 5% of cases. With a $400,000 thresh-
old, adjustment for quality of life would affect choice for
2% of interventions.
Conclusions: For interventions aimed at cancer, the out-
come measures of cost/life-year and cost/QALY are highly
correlated with one another. Although adjusting for qual-
ity of life can make an important difference in the evalu-
ation of alternative approaches to cancer prevention and
control, it often does not.
Keywords: cost-effectiveness analysis, cost–utility ana-
lysis, quality-adjusted life-year, quality of life, utility
assessment.
Introduction
Cost-effectiveness analysis has emerged as the most
common form of economic analysis in the ﬁelds of
medicine and public health, usurping even cost–
beneﬁt analysis [1]. In a cost-effectiveness analysis,
the incremental cost and incremental effectiveness
of an intervention are calculated relative to a com-
parator and a ratio is computed. The numerator of
the ratio is generally the net direct resource con-
sumption, often from the societal perspective. The
denominator is usually either years of life saved
or quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) saved. Eco-
nomic analyses that measure effectiveness as life-
years saved are commonly called “cost-effectiveness
analyses” whereas those reporting QALYs are
referred to as “cost–utility analyses.”
“Life-years” are saved when an intervention
reduces the risk of premature death. For example,
if a death is averted at age 50 and the person lives
until age 85, then the intervention “saves” 35 years
of life. QALYs, on the other hand, are essentially
a measure of multiattribute utility. The two
attributes are survival and health status. For each
health state experienced, analysts assess a numeri-
cal utility, or preference weight, on an interval
scale where the lower bound, often death, is 0 and
the upper bound, often perfect health, is 1. Ana-
lysts multiply this utility by the number of years
over which that health state is experienced. Health
states might be acute health problems such as
pneumonia or injury, chronic diseases such as
AIDS or depression, or side effects such as pain or
nausea. Utilities are assessed with techniques such
as the rating scale, time tradeoff, or standard gam-
ble or through the use of health status instruments
such as the Health Utilities Index, Quality of Well
Being Scale, or EQ-5D.
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The US Public Health Service Panel on Cost-
Effectiveness in Health and Medicine [1] developed
a set of recommendations intended to increase
the uniformity and rigor of methods used in cost-
effectiveness analysis. As the preferred outcome
measure, the Panel recommended QALYs over life-
years. As a way of measuring effectiveness, QALYs
have certain advantages and disadvantages relative
to life-years. Their most important advantage is
that they capture changes in morbidity as well as
mortality. The inclusion of morbidity allows ana-
lysts to factor in outcomes such as the gradual
decline in health status with disease as well as the
side effects from treatment. On the other hand,
QALYs have certain limitations, both theoretical
[2–8] and practical. One practical issue is that
there is little agreement about how to measure the
utilities that are incorporated into QALYs. Utilities
measured or estimated by different authors vary
considerably, even for the same severity of the
same disease. For example, utilities reported in
the literature for major stroke range from 0.02 to
0.71, moderate stroke 0.12 to 0.81, and minor
stroke 0.45 to 0.92 [9]. Utilities for AIDS range
from 0.24 to 0.79, symptomatic HIV 0.48 to 0.82,
and asymptomatic HIV 0.69 to 0.88 [10]. This
variation becomes problematic when different
authors choose different utilities for the same
health state and incorporate those weights into a
QALY measure. The result is variation in cost–util-
ity ratios for different interventions—variation that
does not reﬂect the true relative value of the inter-
ventions. It is conceivable that the cost/QALY for a
new cancer treatment might be lower than the cost/
QALY for a competing treatment, not because
the innovation offers better value for money, but
because different utilities were used for the same
type and severity of cancer.
Quality-adjusting life-years can change a cost-
effectiveness ratio dramatically. QALYs can be
larger or smaller than life-years for the same inter-
vention. For example, the incremental QALYs
offered by an intervention relative to a comparator
will exceed the incremental life-years when the
intervention improves quality of life but does not
improve survival. QALYs will also exceed life-years
when survival is improved, but the increase in qual-
ity of life is large in comparison. Conversely, incre-
mental life-years can exceed incremental QALYs
when a treatment extends life but at the expense of
undesirable side effects that reduce overall quality
of life. It can also occur when an intervention offers
survival improvements that are large in comparison
to improvements in quality of life.
It is evident that the inclusion of utilities in a
cost-effectiveness analysis can dramatically change
the ﬁnal ratio. Nevertheless, although quality of life
can affect the ratio, it remains an open empirical
question whether it generally does have important
impact on the ﬁnal result of the economic analysis.
Such information would be relevant for journal
reviewers and editors, payers, and the analysts
themselves as they seek to assess whether quality
adjustment is necessary. Indeed, this work is partic-
ularly timely because in February 2003 the US
Ofﬁce of Management and Budget, which reviews
all regulations including those that reduce environ-
mental and occupational exposure to carcinogens,
announced that they are considering requiring that
regulatory agencies standardize on QALYs [11].
The objective of this research is to aid decision-
makers in assessing the importance of adjusting for
health-related quality of life in economic analyses of
cancer prevention and control.
Methods
To compare cost/life-year with cost/QALY ratios,
we turned to our existing Cancer Cost-Effectiveness
Database, which contains information for more
than 1500 interventions aimed at cancer preven-
tion, screening, and treatment. We identiﬁed all
studies in this database for which both cost-
effectiveness and cost–utility analyses were per-
formed. We identiﬁed analyses in the database by
searching the National Health Service (NHS), Eco-
nomic Evaluation Database [12], MEDLINE, and
bibliographies of review articles [13]. In addition,
when reviewing each analysis, we noted other
cancer-related articles that were likely to have
cost-effectiveness information and retrieved those
as well.
Our inclusion criteria were as follows: articles
had to be written in English, peer reviewed, and full
length (i.e., not conference abstracts) and report
both cost/life-year and cost/QALY. Of the 353 arti-
cles in our Cancer Cost-Effectiveness database, 39
of them met the inclusion criteria for this study [14–
52]. Some documents contained cost-effectiveness
information for more than one intervention, so we
identiﬁed a total of 110 pairs of ratios.
To create the Cancer Cost-Effectiveness Data-
base, we recorded more than 200 different pieces of
information for each intervention, but used only a
subset of data for this analysis. When necessary,
costs were converted from foreign currencies to US
dollars using historical exchange rates and updated
to 2001 dollars using the US medical consumer
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price index. Two readers read each study and then
met and came to consensus on the content of the
document. The principal investigator then veriﬁed
the accuracy of their work.
To assess the importance of quality of life in cost-
effectiveness analysis we used two strategies. First,
we computed a Spearman correlation to assess the
ordinal relationship between cost/life-year and cost/
QALY. This was intended to assess whether a league
table ranked by cost/QALY would differ from a
table ranked by cost/life-year.
We also adopted a second strategy to consider
the importance of quality of life in informing
resource allocation decisions: in this strategy, we
sought to determine whether the inclusion of
quality-of-life information affected the ultimate
decision implied by the ratio. To implement this
strategy, we used several decision thresholds. For
each plausible threshold we considered whether the
use of each cost/life-year ratio would imply a differ-
ent decision than that implied by the corresponding
cost/QALY ratio. For example, if the decision
threshold is assumed to be $50,000 and the assessed
cost/QALY of an intervention is $45,000, then this
suggests that we should invest in the intervention
because $45,000 is favorable compared to the
$50,000 threshold. If the cost/life-year ratio is
$55,000, then this suggests that we should not
invest as $55,000 is above the $50,000 threshold.
Thus, in this case, the decision would differ depend-
ing on whether we use cost/QALY or cost/life-year
ratios; that is, the inclusion of utility information
affects the resource allocation decision. Note, how-
ever, that if the decision threshold were instead
$200,000, then both ratios would be below the
threshold and the same choice to invest would be
made regardless of the ratio used. In this latter
instance we would say that the inclusion of utilities
did not affect the resource allocation decision.
The question of whether utilities affect decisions
may depend on the choice of the decision threshold.
Thus, in implementing this second strategy, we used
several thresholds for cost/QALY ranging from
$50,000 through $400,000. The lowest ﬁgure of
$50,000 was chosen because of its historical signif-
icance. The largest ﬁgure was chosen as an approx-
imation of the largest willingness-to-pay (WTP)
estimate mentioned in a recent review [53]. For each
threshold, we counted the number of interventions
for which 1) both ratios are below the threshold; 2)
both are above the threshold; 3) cost/life-year is
below but cost/QALY is above; and 4) cost/QALY is
below but cost/life-year is above.
Note that WTP for a life-year and WTP for a
QALY may differ. Because one QALY is equivalent
to an additional year of life in perfect health, or
2 years of life with 0.5 quality of life, 4 years with
0.25 quality of life, etc., the value of a QALY
exceeds that of a life-year because the latter might
be in some state of health short of “perfect.” Hirth
et al. [53] used existing WTP estimates for a life to
derive WTP for a QALY. Consequently, to derive
WTP for a life-year, we used an estimation proce-
dure. First, we noted that Fryback et al. [54,55],
who elicited utilities with the time tradeoff method
from more than 1000 persons, found that the aver-
age utility of subjects in their sample was between
0.8 and 0.94 depending on age and sex. Erickson et
al. [56] used information from the Healthy People
2000 survey and found that the average utility of
persons age 45 to 50 was 0.86, and age 65 to 70
was 0.77. Based on these studies we estimated that
the average life-year is roughly equivalent to 0.8
QALY. WTP for a life-year might therefore be
approximately 20% smaller than WTP for a QALY.
For example, if WTP for a QALY is $50,000, then
we estimate WTP for a life-year to be approxi-
mately $40,000. For each decision threshold for a
QALY that we considered, we derived the corre-
sponding decision threshold for a life-year.
Results
The relationship between cost/life-year and cost/
QALY for 110 interventions is depicted in Figure 1.
Cost/life-year exceeded cost/QALY in 38% of cases
whereas cost/QALY exceeded cost/life-year in 62%
of cases. The rank order correlation between these
two measures is 0.94 (P < .0001).
Next, we considered whether the decision
implied by the two ratios differs for alternate deci-
sion thresholds. As shown in Table 1, if the thresh-
old was $50,000 for both ratios, then 76 of the 110
interventions would be sufﬁciently cost-effective to
warrant adoption regardless of whether cost/life-
Figure 1 The relationship between cost per quality-adjusted life-year
(QALY) and cost per year of  life saved for interventions aimed at can-
cer prevention and control (n = 110).
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year or cost/QALY was used; 29 would not be
judged cost-effective regardless of the measure; 1
would be judged cost-effective only if cost/life-year
were used; and 4 would be considered cost-effective
only if cost/QALY were considered. This suggests
that the implied decision about whether or not to
adopt the technology would be affected by quality
of life adjustment in 5% of cases but not in the
remaining 95%. If a somewhat lower decision
threshold of $40,000 is used for life-years, then 70
interventions would be implemented regardless of
the ratio used; 32 would not be adopted in any case;
1 would be chosen only if cost/life-year were used;
and 7 would be implemented only if cost/QALY
were used. The decision would be affected in 7% of
cases. If a larger threshold such as $400,000 were
assumed for both life-years and QALYs, then 104 of
the 110 interventions would warrant adoption
regardless of the measure used. The decision would
be affected by the inclusion of quality-of-life data in
2% of cases.
Discussion
For interventions aimed at cancer prevention,
screening, or treatment, we identiﬁed a strong ordi-
nal relationship between cost-effectiveness and cost
utility. This implies that a ranking by cost/life-year
will be quite similar to a ranking by cost/QALY.
Further, if resources are limited and funding deci-
sions are made by investing ﬁrst in interventions
that are more cost-effective before proceeding to
interventions that are less cost-effective, then the
composition of the investment portfolio is likely to
be similar regardless of whether cost-effectiveness
or cost–utility ratios are used. We also found that
when  there is no ﬁxed budget per se, and deci-
sions are made using a decision threshold, cost-
effectiveness and cost–utility estimates will generally
lead to similar implied investment decisions. This
was true regardless of the threshold adopted.
We sought to understand why cost/life-year is
so often similar to cost/QALY, leading to similar
implied investment decisions. First, note that since
the numerators are identical, cost-effectiveness and
cost–utility ratios for the same intervention can dif-
fer only in their denominators. Apparently, in most
cases, the incremental gain in life-years of the inter-
vention relative to a comparator is similar to the
incremental gain in QALYs. Why is this? Consider
Figure 2, which depicts a hypothetical, “QALY-
space” of life-years on the horizontal axis and qual-
ity of life on the vertical axis. Suppose that we want
to calculate the gain in health from some interven-
tion relative to a comparator. Those receiving the
comparator live L1 life-years at Q1 quality; thus area
C represents the QALYs associated with the com-
parator. Imagine that the intervention improves
QOL from Q1 to Q2 and life-years from L1 to L2.
Thus the area B + C + E + F represents the QALYs
lived by those who receive the intervention. The
incremental gain in QALYs is therefore B + E + F.
Now imagine that this gain is measured not with
QALYs, but with life-years. The incremental gain in
life-years is clearly the difference between L2 and
L1. Equivalently, life-years are the same as QALYs if
the QOL is assumed to be 1.0 and thinking of it
this way allows us to conceive of life-years as an
area rather than a horizontal distance in Figure 2.
Thus, with the comparator life-years would be
A + B + C and with the intervention life-years
would be A + B + C + D + E + F. The incremental
Table 1 Decision thresholds based on willingness to pay (WTP) for life-years (LY) and quality-adjusted life-years (QALY) and the
investment decision implied depending on ratio used
WTP
life-year
WTP
QALY
C/LY < WTP
C/QALY <  WTP
C/LY ≥ WTP
C/QALY ≥ WTP
C/LY < WTP
C/QALY ≥ WTP
C/LY ≥ WTP 
C/QALY < WTP
$40,000 $50,000 70 32 1 7
$50,000 $50,000 76 29 1 4
$160,000 $200,000 94 11 1 4
$200,000 $200,000 97 8 4 1
$320,000 $400,000 104 5 0 1
$400,000 $400,000 104 4 1 1
Figure 2 Comparison of  a the Incremental gain in QALYs (B + E + F)
with the gain in life-years (D + E + F).
A 
C 
D 
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gain in life-years is therefore D + E + F. Now com-
pare the incremental gain in QALYs (B + E + F)
with the incremental gain in life-years (D + E + F)
and notice that they differ by only one term (B vs.
D). This implies that the incremental gain in
QALYs vs. life-years will be similar when the area
of B is similar to the area of D and/or when B and
D are relatively small in comparison to E + F.
We can use the diagram in Figure 2 to understand
why the three “outlier” studies labeled in Figure 1
found such markedly different cost/life-year and
cost/QALY ratios. In one case, Kim et al. [41] eval-
uated the cost-effectiveness of alternate triage strat-
egies for atypical squamous cells of undetermined
signiﬁcance and found that cost/QALY was consid-
erably more favorable than cost/life-year. The
authors assumed that local cancer had a utility of
0.68, regional cancer 0.56, and distant cancer 0.48.
They also assumed women without cancer over age
40 would have a utility consistent with that of the
national average for women in that age group.
Women under age 40 who were cancer-free were
assumed to have a 1.0 utility. The authors modeled
a hypothetical cohort of young women over a life-
time starting at age 13. In this study, the large dif-
ferential between QALYs and life-years may be due
to two factors: First, utility estimates appear to be
somewhat lower than utilities for cancer found in
the general literature [9]. Exacerbating this effect,
the differential in the utility between cancer states
and noncancer states is quite large before age 40
because of the perfect 1.0 utility assigned to women
who are cancer-free. Second, and perhaps most
importantly, the model begins at an early age, so
that QALYs accumulate over a long time horizon.
Referring to Fig. 2, these factors mean that Q2 = 1.0
for women under 40 and Q2 is distant from Q1 for
all women making the vertical height of B quite
large. Further, because QOL is improved over a
long time horizon, the horizontal width of B is also
large. The result is that the area of B far exceeds the
area of D, ensuring that QALYs gained are much
larger than life-years gained. The outcome is that
cost/QALY is much lower than cost/life-year.
In a second “outlier” study, Tengs et al. [50] per-
formed an economic analysis of school-based
antitobacco education. The authors assigned a
lower health-related utility to smokers than to non-
smokers, basing utility weights on a survey of cur-
rent, former, and never smokers of various ages and
genders. Current smokers in these surveys reported
lower utility than former smokers, and former
smokers reported lower utility than those who had
never smoked. Because smoking occurs over many
years, utility gains from not smoking are accrued
over a long period even before the survival implica-
tions of smoking become evident. As with the ﬁrst
outlier case, the horizontal width of B is large so
that the area of B is again large in comparison to D.
The result is that the QALYs gained far exceed life-
years gained so cost/QALY is much lower than cost/
life-year.
Unlike the studies by Kim et al. and Tengs et al.,
Coley et al. [18] found that cost/life-year was con-
siderably more favorable than cost/QALY. The
authors evaluated the cost-effectiveness of digital
rectal examination and the measurement of pros-
tate-speciﬁc antigen for early detection of prostate
cancer. They assumed utility estimates of 0.5 and
0.8 for hormonally refractive or responsive meta-
static cancer, 0.7 for incontinence, 0.95 for impo-
tence, and 0.85 for treatment-related bowel injury
caused by prostatectomy. It is likely that the exhaus-
tive capture of the iatrogenic effects of surgery in
this analysis accounted for the large differential
between QALYs and life-years. Referring to
Figure 2, this means that Q2 is actually less than Q1;
thus B is quite different from D. The result is that
QALYs gained are less than life-years gained and,
again, cost-effectiveness and cost–utility ratios are
quite different.
The close examination of these three “outlier”
economic analyses combined with the review of the
diagram in Figure 2 offers some insight into when
cost-effectiveness and cost utility will differ greatly.
When the intervention starts early in life and affects
or prevents some chronic health state over a long
time horizon, QALYs can far exceed life-years.
Some additional examples of situations in which
this might occur include psychotherapy or drug
therapy for mental illness or trafﬁc safety measures
to reduce the likelihood of spinal cord and other
nonfatal injuries. Further, the careful accounting of
treatment-caused disutility can also yield a large dif-
ference between QALYs and life-years, but in the
opposite direction. Examples include prophylactic
mastectomy for carriers of the BRCA1 or BRCA2
breast cancer genes, kidney dialysis, or pharmaceu-
tical care when the side effects of medication are
chronic and unpleasant. In cases like these there will
tend to be a large difference between cost/life-year
and cost/QALY ratios.
The examination of Figure 2 should prove useful
to investigators who want to make a decision ex
ante about whether to go to the trouble of gathering
utility data and incorporating QOL into their
economic analysis. Analysts should reason about
whether the areas of B and D are likely to be rela-
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tively large and different from one another. If so,
incorporating QOL is probably wise. If not, it may
be unnecessary. Nevertheless, although helpful, the
diagram necessarily depicts the survival and QOL
implications in a rather stylized fashion. For exam-
ple, the area comprising QALYs is generally not rec-
tangular because QOL often decreases gradually
over time. Nevertheless, this diagram is useful in
illustrating the main reasons why the gain in QALYs
is generally similar to, but occasionally different
from, the gain in life-years.
Although we found that quality adjustment tends
to not affect the implied resource allocation deci-
sion in most cases, several caveats are important
in interpreting our ﬁndings. One limitation of our
research is that the interventions included in our
sample are not a random sample of all medical and
public health interventions. This is in part because,
since this study is part of a larger funded project, the
interventions we examined were chosen because of
their relevance to a speciﬁc disease—cancer. Further,
there many public health and medical interventions
that have not been subjected to economic analysis
and so would not be reﬂected in our larger database
or in this data subset. Additionally, although inter-
ventions for which authors reported only cost/life-
year or only cost/QALY are available in our larger
database, they are not included in the present data
subset used in this analysis for obvious reasons.
This may inﬂuence our ﬁndings because it may be
that when there are important morbidity implica-
tions, authors calculate only cost/QALY and not
cost/life-year. For example, interventions such as
palliative care that are solely intended to improve
QOL would, by deﬁnition, not be included in our
data subset because only cost/QALY can be calcu-
lated for these kinds of interventions. Similarly, it
may be that when the intervention improves sur-
vival and has no implications for quality of life,
authors report only cost/life-year. Thus, to get a
sense of whether our data subset was representative
the database as a whole, we performed a kind of
post hoc analysis on the categories represented. We
found that although the current data subset con-
tains 21% primary prevention, 50% screening, and
29% treatment, the complete database contains
24% primary prevention, 41% screening, and 34%
treatment. As for speciﬁc interventions, 15% of the
subset involves interventions for smoking cessation,
12% cervical cancer screening, 10% breast cancer
screening, 5% colorectal cancer screening, 8%
chemotherapy, and 50% other interventions. The
larger database contains 4% smoking cessation, 7%
cervical cancer screening, 7% breast cancer screen-
ing, 2% colorectal cancer screening, 16% chemo-
therapy, and 64% other interventions. Thus, while
it is certainly possible to ﬁnd speciﬁc interventions
that do not appear in our data subset, the overall
composition of the categories of interventions we
used in this study is similar to the categories in the
complete database. This implies that the categories
of interventions for which both cost/life-year and
cost/QALY are reported do not differ substantially
from the categories of interventions for which only
one ratio is reported. Our data subset therefore is
fairly representative of the overall data set.
In addition, we also performed a post hoc exam-
ination of the extent to which the rigor of the anal-
yses in our subset was similar to the quality of those
in the database as a whole. For all articles in the
database, we coded whether each of the Gold et al.
[1] recommendations was “completely,” “par-
tially,” or “not” met. We then developed a variety
of quality metrics, the simplest of which was the
percentage of recommendations that were com-
pletely met. Although the average for the database a
whole was 48%, the average for this data subset
was 59%. In fact, all but three of the articles in the
present data set had above average quality. Thus, it
is clear that the quality of our data subset is not rep-
resentative of the quality of the entire database—it
is of higher quality. This also means that it is
unlikely that an absence of methodologic rigor in
the studies we examined, for example, in incorpo-
rating QOL, accounts for the results.
To assess whether utility adjustment affects
the implied resource allocation decision, we used a
series of plausible decision thresholds. Because the
value of a QALY exceeds the value of a life-year, we
also assessed the implications of using different
thresholds for cost/life-year ratios than for cost/
QALY ratios. To arrive at the appropriate thresh-
olds, we estimated the average utility of the life-
years gained as 0.8 as that was roughly the average
health status of the adult US population. In reality,
some interventions offer an extension of life in very
good health, some extend life in average health, and
some, as in the case of certain cancer treatments,
extend life with cancer and so offer a gain in life-
years in relatively poor health. We believe that the
0.8 estimate and the assumption that life-years are
worth about 20% less than QALYs is appropriate in
the context of this study because it represents a kind
of reasonable average. Nevertheless, if an individual
investigator wanted to identify an appropriate deci-
sion threshold for cost/life-year by estimating the
relative worth of QALYs versus life-years speciﬁc to
their intervention, they would essentially have to
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estimate QOL over added life-years. Interestingly, in
doing so, they are effectively incorporating utilities
into their assessment, albeit indirectly, to arrive at
this threshold. Thus, it can be argued, the analyst
might as well incorporate utilities at the outset,
calculate cost/QALY, and use a decision threshold
appropriate to a cost/QALY ratio. Although this
argument is logically appealing, we found empiri-
cally that, like quality adjustment, the precise deci-
sion threshold is also relatively unimportant. Our
results reveal that even when the decision thresholds
for cost/QALY and cost/life-year are, somewhat
inappropriately, assumed to be the same, the port-
folio of interventions chosen does not differ much
from when they are assumed to differ by 20%.
Thus, although logically sound, this concern may be
unimportant in practice.
Another caveat in interpreting our results is that
some economic evaluations for cancer treatments
are carried out before survival gains are established
empirically. Nevertheless, note that our data set
includes a broad mix of preventive interventions
and screening, as well as treatment. For many inter-
ventions a model is developed to estimate cost-
effectiveness, generally over the long term. In cases
where survival gains are not established empirically,
authors may have under- or overestimated them
with their model. The same is true of quality of life.
Authors, for various reasons, may under- or over-
estimate QOL. Nevertheless, despite any noise in
cost/life-year and cost/QALY estimates, our results
show that the ratios are remarkably similar.
Finally, although the present study considers
hypothetical decisions made by comparing ratios to
decision thresholds, actual decisions are not gener-
ally made using such a stark criterion. Some
observers have pointed out that cost-effectiveness
information is not typically used at all. Further,
when it is used, it may be that decision makers, such
as payers deciding what treatments to cover or hos-
pital formulary managers deciding what drugs to
include on their list of approved medications, con-
sider analyses more trustworthy if side effects and
other quality of life considerations are incorporated
into the analysis. On the other hand, the opposite
might be true. Decision-makers might believe that
utility estimates lack the objectivity of survival esti-
mates and so might assign more trust to analyses
that omit quality of life.
This research has several important implications.
First, we stress that our results do not imply that
health status is unimportant or that survival alone
matters. Clearly, both are valued. Rather, these
results should be taken as empirical evidence that
the improvements in health status offered by cancer-
related interventions for which economic analyses
are performed, are often related, perhaps even pro-
portional, to improvements in survival.
Conclusion
We found that adjusting for health-related quality
of life often does not make a large difference in the
economic analysis of interventions aimed at can-
cer prevention, screening, and treatment. Cost-
effectiveness and cost–utility estimates are highly
correlated with each other and do not generally lead
to different implied resource allocation decisions.
We have offered a way of estimating ex ante
whether the incorporation of quality of life esti-
mates will greatly affect the cost-effectiveness ratio.
In particular, when an intervention has important
side effects that lower quality of life signiﬁcantly or
improves quality of life over a long time horizon, it
is particularly important to incorporate utilities. In
other instances, adjustment for quality of life may
not be necessary and the estimation of cost per year
of life saved may sufﬁce.
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